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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Matthew R. Kent appeals from the judgment entered upon his conditional 
plea of guilty to possession of a controlled substance with a sentencing 
enhancement for having been previously convicted of possession of a controlled 
substance. Specifically, he challenges the denial of his motion to suppress. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Idaho State Police Trooper Christopher Cottrell performed a traffic stop on 
Kent's vehicle (7/16/14 Tr., p.11, L.2 - p.12, L.2.) When Trooper Cottrell 
approached Kent to ask for his driver's license, insurance, and registration, Kent 
was initially unable to locate the requested documents and was "jittery" and 
"having a hard time focusing." (7/16/14 Tr., p.12, L.23 - p.13, L.25.) Kent 
ultimately looked for the requested items in his glove compartment. (7/16/14 Tr., 
p.14, Ls.1-10.) At about the same time, Trooper Cottrell smelled marijuana 
coming from Kent's vehicle. (7/16/14 Tr., p.14, Ls.11-16.) A search of Kent's 
vehicle yielded a glass pipe and a "dime-sized baggie of methamphetamine." 
(7/16/14 Tr., p.21, Ls.6-14.) 
The state charged Kent with possession of methamphetamine, with a 
sentencing enhancement for a prior possession conviction, and possession of 
paraphernalia. (R., pp.33-34, 77-78.) Kent filed a motion to suppress arguing 
the search of his vehicle was invalid. (R., pp.52-53.) At the conclusion of an 
evidentiary hearing, the district court denied Kent's motion to suppress. (7/16/14 
Tr., p.44, L.17 - p.69, L.1; R., pp.80-81.) 
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Kent entered a conditional plea of guilty to possession of a controlled 
substance with the sentencing enhancement, preserving his right to appeal the 
denial of his motion to suppress. (R., p.84; 9/8/14 Tr., p.7, L.10 p.21, 16.) 
The district court imposed a unified sentence of nine years with the first three 
years fixed. (R., pp. 87-90; 10/27/14 Tr., p.36, Ls.9-12.) Kent timely appealed 
from the judgment. (R., pp.95-97.) 
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ISSUE 
Kent states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the district court err in denying Mr. Kent's Motion to 
Suppress? 
(Appellant's brief, p.4.) 
The state rephrases the issue as: 




Kent Has Failed To Show Error In The Denial Of His Motion To Suppress 
A. Introduction 
Kent challenges the denial of his motion to suppress, arguing as he did 
below that law enforcement impermissibly extended his traffic stop and did not 
have probable cause to search his vehicle after finding no contraband in the 
glove compartment of his vehicle. Because the trooper smelled marijuana 
coming from Kent's vehicle, the purpose of the traffic stop was lawfully extended 
and law enforcement had probable cause to search the vehicle. Kent has 
therefore failed to show error in the denial of his motion to suppress. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a 
decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, we accept the trial court's 
findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but we freely review 
the application of constitutional principles to the facts as found." State v. Colvin, 
157 Idaho 881, 882, 341 P.3d 598, 599 (Ct. App. 2014). 
'"[D]eterminations of reasonable suspicion and probable cause should be 
reviewed de novo on appeal."' State v. Munoz, 149 Idaho 121,127,233 P.3d 
52, 58 (2010) (quoting Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996) 
(brackets original)). "[l]n conducting that review the appellate court 'should take 
care both to review findings of historical fact only for clear error and to give due 
weight to inferences drawn from those facts by resident judges and local law 
enforcement officers."' ~ The power to assess the credibility of witnesses, 
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resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is vested in 
the trial court. State v. Valdez-Molina, 1 Idaho 102, 106, 897 P.2d 993, 997 
(1995); State v. Fleenor, 133 Idaho 552, 555, 989 P.2d 784, 787 (Ct. App. 1999). 
The appellate court also gives deference to any implicit findings of the trial court 
supported by substantial evidence. State v. Brauch, 133 Idaho 215, 218, 984 
P.2d 703, 706 (1999). 
C. Kent Has Failed To Show Error In The Denial Of His Suppression Motion 
It is well-settled that a police officer may, in compliance with the Fourth 
Amendment, make an investigatory stop of an individual if that officer entertains 
a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is underway. State v. Gallegos, 120 
Idaho 894, 896, 821 P.2d 949, 951 (1991). Because a routine vehicle traffic stop 
is normally limited in scope and duration, it is analogous to an investigative 
detention and is analyzed under the principles set forth in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 
1 (1968). Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979); State v. Sheldon, 139 Idaho 
980, 983, 88 P.3d 1220, 1223 (Ct. App. 2003). 
"An investigative detention must be temporary and last no longer than 
necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop." State v. Grantham, 146 Idaho 
490, 496, 198 P.3d 128, 134 (Ct. App. 2008) (citations omitted). However, the 
purpose of a stop, and the length of the stop to effectuate its purpose, is not 
necessarily fixed at the time of initiation. See, s.9.,., State v. Brumfield, 136 Idaho 
913, 917, 42 P.3d 706, 710 (Ct. App. 2002) ("Although the vehicular stop began 
as one to investigate the operation of an unregistered automobile, information 
quickly developed which justified expansion of the detention to investigate a 
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possible drug offense."). "The officer's observations, general inquiries, and 
events succeeding the stop may - and often do - give rise to legitimate reasons 
for particular lines of inquiry and further investigation by an officer." State v. 
Meyers, 118 Idaho 608, 613, 798 P.2d 453, 458 (Ct. App. 1990). 
The automobile exception to the warrant requirement permits the search 
of a vehicle when there is probable cause to believe there is contraband or 
evidence of criminal activity inside. California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 572 
(1991 ); United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 824-25 (1982); State v. Tucker, 132 
Idaho 841, 842, 979 P.2d 1199, 1200 (1999); State v. Yeoumans, 144 Idaho 
871,873,172 P.3d 1146, 1148 (Ct. App. 2007); State v. Gibson, 141 Idaho 277, 
281, 108 P.3d 424, 428 (Ct. App. 2005). "Probable cause is established if the 
facts available to the officer at the time of the search would warrant a person of 
reasonable caution in the belief that the area or items to be searched contained 
contraband or evidence of a crime." Yeoumans, 144 Idaho at 873, 172 P.3d at 
1148 (citing Ross, 456 U.S. at 823). If probable cause exists to justify the search 
of a lawfully stopped vehicle, it justifies the search of every part of the vehicle 
and its contents that may conceal the object of the search. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 
825; State v. Murphy, 129 Idaho 861, 864, 934 P.2d 34, 37 (Ct. App. 1997). 
Probable cause for such a search is established when a trained officer detects 
the smell of marijuana in a vehicle. State v. Gonzales, 117 Idaho 518, 519, 789 
P.2d 206, 207 (Ct. Appp. 1990). "The smell of marijuana alone can satisfy the 
probable cause requirement for a warrantless search." State v. Gonzales, 117 
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Idaho 518, 789 P.2d 206 (Ct. App. 1990) (quoting State v. Capps, 97 N.M. 453, 
641 484, 487 (N.M. 1982) (emphasis in original)). 
In denying Kent's motion to suppress, the court found Trooper Cottrell had 
training in narcotics investigation, specifically marijuana (7/16/14 Tr., p.45, Ls.5-
24), and was a credible witness (7/16/14 Tr., p.68, Ls.1-4). The court found the 
"rather distinctive smell of marijuana" coming from Kent's vehicle provided 
probable cause to search pursuant to the automobile exception. (7/16/14 Tr., 
p.60,L.6 - p.68, L.13.) 
In this case, Kent does not challenge the court's findings or its legal 
determination that the initial traffic stop and extension in duration up to the 
search of the glove compartment was valid. (See generally Appellant's brief.) 
Instead, Kent contends that Trooper Cottrell violated his Fourth Amendment 
rights by "improperly extend[ing] the detention and execut[ing] an impermissible 
search after not discovering any marijuana in the glove box." (Appellant's brief, 
pp.6-7.) In fact, Kent concedes "that the smell of marijuana emanating from the 
inside of a vehicle can create probable cause to search a vehicle under the 
automobile exception." (Appellant's brief, p.7 (citation omitted).) He argues, 
without support, that "any probable cause possessed by the officer in initiating 
the search dissipated after he searched the glove box and did not discovery [sic] 
any contraband." (Id.) Kent's argument is without merit. 
As the district court correctly concluded, "the scope of the traffic stop was 
not unreasonably expanded" and the trooper "had probable cause to search 
[Kent's] vehicle based upon the fact that Corporal Cottrell smelled the odor of 
7 
marijuana from inside [Kent's] vehicle." (R., p.81.) Trooper Cottrell conducted a 
traffic stop of Kent's vehicle and approached his vehicle to obtain his driver's 
license, registration, and insurance. (7/16/14 Tr., p.12, Ls.3-25.) Kent was 
"jittery" and had "a hard time focusing" when looking for the requested 
documentation. (7/16/14 Tr., p.13, Ls.22-25.) Kent ultimately looked for his 
documents in his glove box. (7/16/14 Tr., p.14, Ls.5-10.) At that time, the 
trooper "smelled the odor of marijuana coming from the vehicle." (7/16/14 Tr., 
p.14, Ls.11-16.) Because that observation occurred as the original purpose of 
the traffic stop was still underway, Trooper Cottrell did not impermissibly extend 
the traffic stop by conducting a search for contraband based on probable cause 
developed from the smell of marijuana coming from Kent's vehicle. Trooper 
Sproat assisted Trooper Cottrell in the search of Kent's vehicle. (7/16/14 Tr., 
p.33, Ls.9-12.) As Trooper Sproat "came in on the driver's side" of the 
automobile and "was kind of leaning over toward the center console," he "noticed 
the odor of marijuana pretty distinctly." (7/16/14 Tr., p.33, Ls.19-22.) 
Trooper Cottrell first noticed the odor of marijuana coming from Kent's 
vehicle at the same time Kent was looking in his glove compartment for his 
insurance and registration. (7/16/14 Tr., p.14, Ls.5-10.) Trooper Sproat smelled 
marijuana coming from Kent's vehicle when the trooper leaned in the car, over 
the center console, to assist with a search. (7/16/14 Tr., p.33, Ls.19-22.) The 
testimony of neither officer limited the origin of the odor of marijuana strictly to 
the glove compartment of Kent's vehicle. The probable cause developed by the 
odor of marijuana did not limit a search to any specific area of Kent's vehicle, but 
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instead gave the officers the right to search every part of the vehicle that might 
conceal marijuana. State v. Anderson, 154 Idaho 703, 706-08, 302 P.3d 328, 
331-333 (2012) (probable cause maintained after drug dog failed to alert in 
interior of vehicle). 
Because the smell of marijuana coming from Kent's vehicle gave Trooper 
Cottrell probable cause to believe he would find evidence of a crime or 
contraband in the vehicle, Trooper Cottrell properly extended the original traffic 
stop and searched the vehicle. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment and 
sentence and the district court's order de ·ng ent's motion to suppress. 
DATED this 18th day of Se 1em 
( 
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